Concerned Philosophers for Peace

Since its inception in 1981, Concerned Philosophers for Peace (CPP) has become the largest, most active organization of professional philosophers in North America involved in the analysis of the causes of war and prospects for peace.

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Andrew Fiala, California State University, Fresno, Conference Chair
Greg Moses, Texas State University, Zoom Host
Court Lewis, Pellissippi State Community College, Zoom Host
Virtual Conference Guidelines and Recommendations

- Presenters will have 25 minutes each. Recommended: 20 minute talk with 5 minute discussion. Please respect the time of all participants and stick to the 25 minute time limit. Session Chairs are encouraged to keep time.

- Participants other than the Presenter should keep your microphone on MUTE.

- It is acceptable to turn off your camera during presentations. However, if you ask a question it is recommended that you turn your camera on.

- Discussants are encouraged to use the chat function in Zoom to pose questions and share information.

- Discussants should use the “Raise Hand” function in Zoom in order to be recognized by the Chair/Speaker. Session Chairs will be encouraged to help with Q&A and the chat.

- Video Recording
  - Sessions may be recorded. Attendees may record their own sessions for personal use.

- There are two Zoom rooms for this conference. One is hosted by Court Lewis at Pellissippi Community College. The other is hosted by Greg Moses at Texas State University.

- Zoom Room 1 will be set up as webinar. You will need to Register in advance for this webinar: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_LiYs4r6DRPefJaaHxEytlA

- If you have technical problems contact:
  - Greg Moses (Zoom Room 1): m95@txstate.edu
  - Court Lewis (Zoom Room 2): court.lewis@gmail.com
  - Andrew Fiala: afiala@csufresno.edu
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
Conference Program

Schedule

All Times are Central Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Chair/Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:45</td>
<td>Welcome and Orientation (Zoom Room 1)</td>
<td>Andrew Fiala, Greg Moses, Court Lewis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 9:00-10:15 | Moral Injury, Violence, and Free Speech | Chair: Andrew Fiala  
- Sanjay Lal, “Broadening the Category of Moral Injury to Better Grasp the Wrong of Violence”  
- Tena Thau, “The Free Speech Argument Against Mass Incarceration” |
| 10:30-11:45 | Environmental Issues | Chair: Will Barnes  
- Kelly Coble, “The Ethics of Migration in a Climate Disrupted World”  
- Chaitanya Motupalli, “Climate Change and Human Security”  
| 12:00-1:00 | Lunch Break | Zoom Room Open to Visit/Chat |

Friday, January 29
ZOOM ROOM 1 Webinar
https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_LiYs4r6DRPefJaaHxEytIA

Friday, January 29
ZOOM ROOM 2
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88486666531

Just War Issues
Chair: Jennifer Kling
- Kevin Cutright, “The Principle of Right Intention in Military”  
- Blake Hereth, “Health Justice for Unjust Combatants”  
- Kim Caccamo, “Drone Warfare Challenges Peace Through Its Connection to Terrorism” 

Robots, Social Media, and Virtual Reality
Chair: Paula Smithka
- Dakota Layton, “Fake News in the Information Age: The Challenges it Poses for Peace”  
- Danielle Poe, “Behind the Curtain”  
- Keith Abney, “AI/Robots, Just War Theory, and Policing: The Limits of an Analogy”
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
Conference Program

1:00-2:15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADUATE STUDENT PANEL 1</th>
<th>Historical Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Fuat Gursozlu</td>
<td>Chair: Bill Gay</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Victor Abundez-Guerra, “Collective Responsibility with Blame”</td>
<td>• Anna Taft, “Action and Fabrication: Integrating Two Modes”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shoshana McClarence, “The Limits of Freedom: Intersectional Constraints Toward a Peaceful Life”</td>
<td>• Will Barnes, “Satyagraha and the Post-Structuralist Psychoanalytic Subject: Judith Butler’s On The Force of Nonviolence”</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Tony White, “Skepticism of Killing in Self-Defense”</td>
<td>• Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, “Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism: An Exposition”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2:30-3:45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADUATE STUDENT PANEL 2</th>
<th>Nonviolent Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair: Casey Rentmeester</td>
<td>Chair: Blake Hereth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Derick Hughes, “Virtuous Migrants”</td>
<td>• Stephen C. S. DiLorenzo,” Does Civil Resistance Rely on the Justice of the Opposing Regime?”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4:00-5:00

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: BARRY GAN (St. Bonaventure University)
“Peace and Hope In Dark Times”
Introduction by Greg Moses

ZOOM ROOM 1 Webinar
https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_LiYs4r6DRPeFJaahHxExyIa
## Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference Program

**Saturday, January 30**
**ZOOM ROOM 1**  
https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_LiYs4r6DRPejAaHxEytiA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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| 9:00-10:15 | Panel on Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, *Pragmatic Nonviolence: Working Toward a Better World*  
**Chair:** Barry Gan  
- Sanjay Lal, Clayton State University  
- Danielle Poe, University of Dayton  
- Mechthild Nagel, SUNY Cortland,  
- Bill Gay, UNC Charlotte  
- Andrew Fitz-Gibbon, SUNY Cortland |
| 10:30-11:45| **ACORN SYMPOSIUM I**  
Panel: "Gandhi’s Influence on the Civil Rights Movement"  
**Chair:** Sanjay Lal, Clayton State University  
- Gail Presbey, University of Detroit Mercy, "Gandhi’s Distinct Contribution to Nonviolent Strategy and Tactics, as Enacted by Subsequent Activists"  
- Greg Moses, Texas State University, "William Stuart Nelson's Kolkata Lectures"  
- Anthony Neal, Mississippi State University, “Gandhi, Thurman and the Question of Aim” |
| 12:00-1:00 | **LUNCH BREAK**  
**ZOOM ROOM 1 OPEN TO VISIT/CHAT** |

**Saturday, January 30**
**ZOOM ROOM 2**  
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88486666531

<table>
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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| Civilizational Concerns  
**Chair:** Court Lewis  
- Solomon Laleye, “Between the Government and the Governed in the Quest for Sustainable Peace in Africa”  
- James Walker, “Towards a Radical Peace Studies”  
- Jiang Lu, “Karl Jasper’s Existential Humanism and its Impact for World Peace” |
| 10:30-11:45| **Democracy and Authority**  
**Chair:** Andrew Fiala  
- Casey Rentmeester, “Trump’s Dangerous Authoritarian Ideology”  
- Garret Merriam, “The Dilemma of Peaceful Fascism”  
- John Park, “Meritocratic Democracy Over Democracy & Epistocracy for Minority Rights” |
| 12:00-1:00 | **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING**  
**ZOOM ROOM 2** |

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5
# Concerned Philosophers for Peace
## Conference Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| 1:00-2:15 | **ACORN SYMPOSIUM II**                       | Panel: Author Meets Critics: “A Sense of Brutality: Philosophy After Narco-Culture” by Carlos Alberto Sanchez  
Chair: José-Antonio Orosco, Oregon State University  
- Carlos Sanchez, San Jose State University  
- Manuela Alejandra Gomez, El Paso Community College  
- Julio Covarrubias, Hobart and Williams Smith Colleges |
| 2:30-3:45 | **GRADUATE STUDENT PANEL 3**                | Chair: Daniele Poe  
- Molly Kelly, “Aristotle Revisited: Hybrid Regimes, Nominal Transformation, and the “Sense” of Injustice”  
- Rashad Rehman, “Amor est causa pacis: A Pieperian Reading of Aquinas’ Theory of Peace”  
- Tanner Eckstein, “Marxism and Peace” |
| 4:00-5:00 | **BUSINESS MEETING**                       | Zoom Room 2: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88486666531                      |
| 5:30-6:30 | **PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:**                  | PAULA SMITHKA (University of Southern Mississippi)  
“Reconstruction 2021: Restoring Health, Truth, and Democracy”  
Introduction by Court Lewis  
Zoom Room 1: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_LiYs4r6DRPefJaaHxEytIA |
## Abstracts and Presenter Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Institution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abney Keith</td>
<td>AI/robots, just war theory, and policing: the limits of an analogy</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kabney@calpoly.edu">kabney@calpoly.edu</a></td>
<td>California Polytechnic State University – San Luis Obispo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abundez-Guerra</td>
<td>Collective Responsibility with Blame</td>
<td><a href="mailto:vguerra227@gmail.com">vguerra227@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>UC Riverside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnes Will</td>
<td>Satyagraha and the Post-Structuralist Psychoanalytic Subject: A defense of Judith Butler’s On The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind</td>
<td><a href="mailto:will@planetarycollective.com">will@planetarycollective.com</a></td>
<td>Curry College</td>
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</table>
An obstacle standing between the violent now and a peaceful future, limiting what we can hope for, is the human predilection for violence. Care ethicists working with a relational notion of the self argue that relationality entails a caring or sympathetic disposition. At the other pole, Hobbesian individualism relegates the social bond and takes an anti-social warlike bellicosity as the foundation of human being. The picture from psychoanalysis resists both poles, arguing that the social bonds which constitute subjectivity are ambivalent; combining the potential for violence and hatred with the potential for care, empathy, and love. Given the destructive potential inherent within psychosocial relations, what possibility is there to achieve an international agreement that would minimize violence and conflict? A significant portion of the philosophical literature considers non-violence a matter of an individual faced with a moral choice when in truth, but our ethical choices are radically inter-subjective and socio-historically constructed within a political frame. This often means that a society will consider “violent” anything that it takes as threatening to its existence. Members of marginalized groups may be perceived as inherently violent, and societies will consider “defensive” maneuvers against them, as not violent in an objectionable sense. In her recent book *On The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind* Judith Butler argues that any defensible ethics of non-violence must recognize that within any circumscription of the self and society there is conflict and plurality united by a bond that has the potential to explode into violence, and that the choice of nonviolence is only meaningful in light of that ever-present temptation. Butler recommends not passivity, but forceful non-violence, framed in conversation with Gandhi’s “polite insistence on the truth” or Satyagraha. The goal is conversion, not coercion, and that respecting the other as a grievable equal provides a real and achievable contrast to violence. Though she does not insist on an absolute avoidance of violence in all circumstances, the moral goal should be to recognize the potential for violence at each moment, and to choose non-violence. This choice involves accepting, engaging, and redeploying our potential for violence as well as contesting the media frames closing off such skillful reappropriation of latent hatred for the stake of stoking violent hostility. In this presentation I will provide the psychoanalytic (post)structuralist theory of the subject inchoate but insufficiently developed in the book as a means of, and in addition to, defending Butler’s complex reiteration of Satyagraha.

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<tr>
<th>Caccamo</th>
<th>Drone Warfare Challenges Peace Through Its Connection to Terrorism</th>
<th><a href="mailto:kimberly.caccamo@westpoint.edu">kimberly.caccamo@westpoint.edu</a></th>
<th>United States Military Academy at West Point</th>
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In recent years, the United States has increased its utilization of drone warfare to conduct military operations. Drone technology has advanced significantly, and the landscape of modern war has shifted from large-scale battles to mostly counterinsurgency efforts to stem the impact and spread of terrorism. However, the increased use of drone technology has been met with resistance from experts in various fields of study, especially philosophy, where the permissibility of drone warfare has been scrutinized. In this paper, I will criticize philosopher Daniel Statman’s view that drones are more discriminate and reduce risk to soldiers, which possibly creates an obligation for militaries to utilize them. He believes there is nothing new about drones in comparison to conventional war weaponry, and therefore sees no reason why drone warfare’s morality should be questioned. To support this claim, Statman argues that the practice of targeted killing, which drones often enable, is “far less problematic than critics would have us believe” and therefore targeted killing does not present a persuasive challenge to the use of drones. In contrast to Statman’s view, I find that targeted killing presents a huge challenge to the permissibility of drone warfare. Targeted killings are “premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody”. When drone warfare utilizes this method of killing, a distinctive fear, characterized by the element of surprise, is created in the population of the targeted country. This type of fear is also created by acts of terrorism, and while the creation of that fear by terrorists is often purposeful, drone warfare could qualify as unintentional terrorism as it also causes this surprise-laden fear. Therefore, the permissibility of drone warfare is questionable. After critiquing the practice of targeted killing and its employment through drone warfare, I will suggest three heuristics that could help to regulate drone warfare by limiting the scope of employment of targeted killing. Therefore, drone warfare could remain a viable option to engage the enemy. Firstly, the controversial tactic of “signature strikes” needs to be renounced by senior military and political officials immediately. Secondly, targeted killing should be performed only when there is no risk of civilians being killed. Finally, targeting killing is
a practice that should be reserved to eliminate extremely high value targets only. These heuristics limit the negative effects of drone warfare, specifically the fear created by drones using the tactic of targeted killing, so that drone warfare could still be permissible on a small scale as it would no longer possess a distinctive feature of terrorism. While our search for peace ultimately demands reducing how often countries choose to resort to war, believing in a world completely free from war can sometimes seem unrealistic. Therefore, I believe it is important to regulate the emerging technology being used to fight our wars in order to maintain as fair of a battlefield as possible and ensure countries can achieve a just and lasting peace at conflict’s end.

Chae Lee-Ann Solidarity lchae@temple.edu Temple University

One of the frustrating features of structural oppression is that there doesn’t seem to be anyone to hold accountable. Because the oppression is diffuse, and can operate even without any intention to oppress, it’s difficult to pin blame on any one person or group. And the frustration produced by living under an oppressive regime without being able to hold anyone to account can help us to understand the contemporary phenomenon of cancel culture (or call out culture). Instead of accepting that there is no one to blame, cancel culture holds each person who intentionally or unintentionally participates in perpetuating oppression responsible. If, upon interrupting Jane, Bob explains, “I’m sorry, I thought you were done talking,” then whether or not the explanation is sincere, Bob can be called out as an oppressor – in particular, as a misogynist – for silencing a woman.

But I think that call out culture suffers from two main drawbacks. One, as Iris Marion Young argued, oppression is a relation between social groups, not individuals, and can operate independently of any intention to oppress. Then it seems inappropriate to hold individuals to responsible for oppression (e.g., holding Bob responsible for misogyny instead of holding him responsible for, say, being a jerk or an inconsiderate conversation partner). And two, call out culture calls for a kind of moral purity that might not be possible. As feminists and critical race theorists have argued, we are all privileged on some dimension. This means that even as we call others out, we ourselves are appropriate targets for being called out.

I think a better solution to the frustrating problem posed by structural oppression is solidarity. As others like Sally Scholz have noted, solidarity is necessary in order to work towards justice. But I’d like to argue that solidarity is necessary even (or perhaps, especially) in domains where justice does not apply. For example, can it be argued on a Rawlsian picture that justice requires us all to wear masks during a pandemic? Even if the answer is no, I think solidarity can still require us all to wear a mask. Solidarity is not (just) about justice and rights, but about being properly attuned to the social and political needs of others.

The dominant approaches to solidarity, including Sally Scholz and Tommie Shelby, hold solidarity to be supererogatory. I’d like to argue that solidarity is a duty (albeit a weak or imperfect (as opposed to perfect) one). If I’m right, then solidarity is not merely of practical or instrumental value, as Scholz and Shelby argue, but of intrinsic value, as well.

Christoyannopoulos Alexandre Tolstoy’s Christian Anarcho-Pacifism: An Exposition a.christoyannopoulos@gmail.com Loughborough University

In the last thirty years of his life, Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) wrote many books, essays and pamphlets expounding his maturing views on violence, the state, and how to improve the human condition. Since then, these ‘Christian anarchist’ and pacifist views have often been dismissed as utopian or naive, and despite inspiring numerous activists, often forgotten or ignored. This paper seeks to examine them in greater detail. The paper begins by explaining in what way Tolstoy’s ‘Christianity’ was unconventional, with its heavy focus on morality. Tolstoy’s political thought is then divided into four main themes: pacifism, anarchism, anticlericalism, and activist methods. For each theme, Tolstoy’s main contentions are first summed up, then some of their criticisms are discussed, and then some reflections are offered on their ongoing relevance today. The paper argues that despite being an odd Christian, an odd pacifist, an odd anarchist and an odd activist, Tolstoy put forward: a compelling denunciation of violence which influenced numerous thinkers and activists; a
condemnation of state violence and deception which can be extended to today’s globalised political economy; a bitter critique of the church which can be extended to religious institutions of our time; and a method of activism through withdrawal which continues to generate debate and is increasingly adopted by a variety of activists today. In short: this paper presents and discusses Tolstoy’s Christian anarcho-pacifist political thought so that it can continue to deserve to be taken seriously as an inspiration in dark times.

Coble  Kelly  
*The Ethics of Migration in a Climate Disrupted World*  
kcoble@bw.edu  Baldwin Wallace University

The world is becoming increasingly closed or inimical to migration, even as climate change will cause humans to move in unprecedented numbers. Walls and barriers are multiplying as the world enters a climate in which, increasingly, mere survival depends on freedom of movement. The concurrence of these two facts, the tragedy of their coexistence, gives a renewed urgency to ethical examination of issues associated with borders and migration, entry and membership. At the same time, when we consider the ethical debates around the legitimacy of national borders, themes that have become salient in our period of climate disruption are conspicuous in their absence. Regardless of the merits of the familiar cosmopolitan and communitarian positions on borders and movement, our current situation enjoins us to revisit these issues with a wider lens and a fuller vocabulary. In a range of scenarios in which the land that hundreds of millions, potentially billions, of humans call home will become uninhabitable due to excessive heat, droughts, and rising sea levels, the current global trend toward building walls promises to have a profound and lethal effect. At the same time, the prospect of “open borders” has inspired ethno-nationalist reactions worldwide and a disregard for “the rights of others” at or within one’s borders. Meanwhile there are other trends receiving less attention. Increasingly, people’s affective lives are shaped by a heightened attunement to ecological vulnerabilities at a local-regional scale. At the same time, these bioregional vulnerabilities are alerting us to the transnational character of climate threats. Ursula Heise has made a compelling case for an emergent ecocosmopolitanism based on dynamic global networks of communication and culture. Glenn Albrecht has argued, in response, that the dynamics of the negative and positive “earth emotions” he names and describes are driving a resurgence of local and regional identity, animating local political responses to ecological threats. I agree with Albrecht that an endemic love of place is necessary to motivate efforts to conserve and protect our local and regional ecologies. In the absence of such efforts there can be no resilience or successful “adaptation” to climate change.

But can love of place coexist with an acceptance of strangers (human and nonhuman) into our bioregional communities? Drawing insights from Heise’s “ecocosmopolitanism,” Albrecht’s “Symbiocene society,” and Benhabib’s democratic cosmopolitanism, I argue that it can. Our local cultures and ecosystems are already characterized by movement and hybridity among their members. In addition, bioregional communities in the poorest, most vulnerable parts of the world will require assistance from wealthier, resource-rich nations to survive in a warming world. From what motive springs do we draw support for these efforts? I argue that our endemic love of place is where to begin. Support for the most endangered communities (encompassing human and nonhuman members) is equivalent to support for the surrounding communities that would have to absorb these populations, and that face related ecological threats due to their bioregional linkages. Eventually, among those communities we encounter our own.

Coslovi  Dean  
*The Gentle Way: The Philosophy of Judo and the Life of Yoshio Senda*  
deancoslovi@gmail.com  University of Calgary

In late nineteenth century Japan, educator and martial artist Kano Jigoro developed a new martial art that he called judo. The word judo can be translated as the “gentle way.” The gentle way refers to the fundamental principle of judo whereby power is not met by power, but rather power is redirected. In this way, practitioners of judo (judoka) are trained to use their opponents’ aggression against them. By utilizing an opponent’s momentum, a seemingly weaker and smaller person can overcome a stronger and larger one. However, Kano did not believe that judo should merely be a new fighting system. Rather, Kano viewed judo as a means of developing both one’s physical body as well as one’s spirit. Through this development, Kano believed that the
The practice of judo could inculcate in judoka the values necessary to make one a virtuous person. If one is a virtuous person, then one will necessarily be a benefit to one’s family, one’s community, and humanity as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how the philosophy of judo can be applied to a life. Dr. Yoshio Senda lived a life dedicated to the philosophy of judo. Senda is the recipient of both the highest civilian honour given to Canadians, the Order of Canada, and the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Rays, which was conferred upon him by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. This paper will elucidate how a wartime internee went from living in a chicken coop to becoming an internationally recognized man of virtue.

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<th>Covarrubias Julio</th>
<th>Comment on Carlos Sanchez: A Sense of Brutality</th>
<th><a href="mailto:covarrubiascabeza@hwss.edu">covarrubiascabeza@hwss.edu</a></th>
<th>Hobart and William Smith Colleges</th>
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Comment on Carlos Sanchez...

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<th>Cutright Kevin</th>
<th>The principle of right intention in military ethics</th>
<th><a href="mailto:kevin.cutright@westpoint.edu">kevin.cutright@westpoint.edu</a></th>
<th>United States Military Academy at West Point</th>
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The principle of right intention in military ethics is generally thought to be a person’s disposition toward a just and lasting peace. Early just war theorists emphasized right intention as essential to the moral warrant for war and to soldiers’ conduct in it. The principle is meant to serve as a correction for statesmen or soldiers who may have a justified cause for war but use that cause merely as a screen for other purposes. As modern thinkers drew brighter lines between jus ad bellum and jus in bello (and eventually jus post bellum), right intention only appeared in the ad bellum category. Presumably, it could still influence in bello considerations by its presence in the deliberations precipitating war. However, right intention received only circumspect attention in the modern discourse on jus ad bellum. Some scholars have suggested that right intention is redundant or impossible to corroborate and should be subsumed under the principle of just cause. This turn corresponds with a greater focus on rule-based approaches to morality instead of traditional character-based approaches. While I acknowledge the benefits of these rule-based approaches, I want to argue for the relevance of the character-based approaches as an important complement. Right intention, as a character trait, deserves a place as an explicit principle under jus in bello. It helps to offset three shortcomings that a strictly rule-based framework can foster among soldiers: a checklist technique of moral evaluation, an overly bureaucratic mindset, and most importantly, a neglect of the motivations needed for right action. Reasoning alone does not prompt action; there must also be a corresponding affective commitment to principles or values that lead to right action. The principle of right intention thus emphasizes the character required for the pursuit of justice, not the state of affairs required to realize justice (as does the principle of just cause). Given this difference, we ought to explicitly distinguish right intention as a vital component of jus in bello.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dichter Rachel</th>
<th>Social Media in Relation to the COVID-19 Anti-Lockdown Protests: A Threat to Peace and a Source of Hope</th>
<th><a href="mailto:rdcichter@nd.edu">rdcichter@nd.edu</a></th>
<th>University of Notre Dame</th>
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Recent anti-lockdown protests over COVID-19 social distancing orders have demonstrated that pandemic-related frustrations represent a contemporary threat to peace across the globe. In addition, individuals stuck at home spend large amounts of time accessing information on the internet, and in particular, on social media platforms. This paper takes a closer look at social media in relation to the threat of anti-lockdown protests from two angles: first, as a reason for peace-threatening behavior, and, second, as a source of hope that the attitudes that lead to anti-lockdown protests can be overcome. First, I examine social media as a means for the dissemination of information that contributes to anti-lockdown sentiment. I use Edward Spence’s DOIT-Wisdom model for the evaluation of digital information to identify why the dissemination of information that contributes to anti-lockdown attitudes has negative value. I start by reconstructing the model, which identifies the concept of wisdom as a thick concept that allows for the...
evaluation of digital information; the concept consists in knowing how to live well and successfully applying that knowledge in living well. We can use wisdom to evaluate the dissemination of information by noting that the dissemination of information that conduces to wisdom has positive value, while the dissemination of information that does not conduces to wisdom has negative value.

I argue that because anti-lockdown protests are a threat to peace, they do not conduces to wisdom. The dissemination of information that contributes to anti-lockdown sentiment, therefore, must not conduces to wisdom either. It follows that this dissemination of information has negative value. Since Spence further holds that the dissemination of information can have negative value either by failing to comply with epistemic norms of assertion or by failing to comply with ethical norms of action, the dissemination of information that contributes to antilockdown sentiment must meet one of these criteria. Addressing one anticipated objection premised on Steffen Steinert’s recent argument for the role of social media in the development of emotional contagion, I make a case for the claim that the dissemination of information that contributes to anti-lockdown sentiment does not violate ethical norms of action (Steinert, 2020). This suggests that it has negative value because it violates epistemic norms of assertion: i.e. because the information in question is false.

In the second section, I examine the resources that social media platforms make available to individuals to mitigate the attitudes that lead to peace-threatening behavior. I undertake a descriptive analysis of the attitudes that have led to COVID-19 lockdown protests in the U.S. and abroad, including boredom, economic concern, and conspiratorial anger. I then turn to the capacity of social media interventions to lessen these attitudes. Among the interventions I consider are psychological education initiatives like those that have actually been tried in China (Yao, et al. 2020) and the formation of online friendships (de Laat 2008, Froeding and Peterson 2012). I conclude that the resources of social media alone are unlikely to provide the kind of emotional support to would-be protesters that would prevent them from partaking in peacethreatening behavior.

### DiLorenzo Stephen C. S.
**Does Civil Resistance Rely on the Justice of the Opposing Regime?**

Many doubters of the effectiveness of civil-resistance movements claim that these movements merely rely on a reigning regime’s fragile willingness to adhere to a moral constraint against harming civilians. This common claim is problematic for multiple reasons. Firstly this claim may be descriptively false, as others have pointed out; civil-resistance movements can succeed despite a regime’s willingness to harm civilians. Secondly and more important to this paper, these doubters have made an assumption about the permissibility of a regime’s tactics without considering the justice of the movement’s cause. Abstracting the permissibility of a tactic from a civil-resistance movement’s cause yields undesirable results both for the permissibility of tactics and also the role of justice.

This same abstraction of tactics from the justice of the cause is also offered by traditional just warfare theorists to claim that the justice or injustice of the cause that a combatant supports is irrelevant to which tactics may be permissibly used. Irrespective of the cause, traditional understandings of the principles of proportionality, double effect, and supreme emergency all allow for the harming of civilians in war. If the same abstraction of tactics from justice is allowed in civil-resistance movements, then these principles could be plausibly invoked by reigning regimes against civil-resistance movements, and harming civilians in civil-resistance movements would never be categorically impermissible irrespective of the justice of the movement’s cause.

However, if the proponent of civil-resistance movements disallows abstracting the permissibility of tactics from the justice of the cause (as revisionist just warfare theorists do), then the justice of the cause retains its prominence and deeply influences the permissibility of certain tactics. In civil resistance movements as well as war, the denial of this abstraction entails that all harms done by the unjust side are impermissible, and the aforementioned principles cannot be invoked by unjust regimes.

Denying the abstraction of the permissibility of tactics from the cause entails that civil-resistance movements cannot rely on a categorical impermissibility of harming civilians (or the categorical permissibility of civil resistance movements). Such movements must rely on the justice of the cause and must prominently feature this just cause. It might be assumed that all civil-resistance movements have a just cause, but there are indeed prominent counterexamples. Proponents of a civil-resistance movement must ensure their cause is just.
Now, the doubter of the effectiveness of civil-resistance movements will subsequently claim that the success of a civil resistance movement then merely depends on a reigning regime’s fragile willingness to adhere to the dictates of justice. This is true, but not in the way the doubter intends. Rather than being evidence of the ineffectiveness of civil resistance, a regime’s disregard of justice is the necessary cause of the just civil-resistance movement. Questions of the effectiveness of a just civil resistance movement are indeed debatable questions, but these are merely descriptive questions. The permissibility of tactics and the role of justice are clear.

One of the most common criticisms levied against Marxism is the existence (past or present) of violent tyrannical dictatorships that have declared themselves “Marxist” across the globe. These regimes have been cited as examples that prove Marxism is a failure as a political-philosophical doctrine. Opponents of Marxism declare that the oppressiveness of figures like Stalin, Castro, or Mao prove that Marxism is not only philosophically flawed, but also always leads to authoritarianism. These assumptions seem unfair on a philosophical level and allow many people the luxury of simply dismissing Marxism without critically reading what he wrote. As philosophers, I believe we have a responsibility to study Marxism in an objective manner. If we allow authoritarian figures to define our understanding of philosophers, then we have already fallen into the type of thinking that said figures want us to possess. That is why in this paper I am going to try and answer the following question: Is Marxism compatible with peace? Specifically, can a Marxist revolution be peaceful? Or are Marxist revolutions always inherently violent? The logic used against Marxism is that its revolutions are always inherently violent, thus giving birth to violent regimes. If, however, it was shown that Marxism is not inherently violent, then the oppressive regimes claiming to be Marxists could be shown to be misinterpretations instead of the norm of Marxism. In trying to answer the aforementioned questions I will analyze three highly influential Marxist philosophers. Karl Marx himself will be the first, Karl Korsch the second, and György Lukács the third. Marxism is an incredibly rich philosophical tradition with many different thinkers, so conceivably my paper could be much longer and include many more theorists. However, I have chosen to analyze these three philosophers and their works because they are the theorists most concerned with the actual Marxist revolution. These three philosophers devoted an extensive amount of resources to determining what kind of conditions make a Marxist revolution possible, and also what a Marxist revolution would look like. If we are to answer the question of whether a Marxist revolution is compatible with peace (thus proving that Marxism itself is not inherently violent), these are the theorists we should be studying. The first task of this paper will be to analyze Marx’s own thoughts on revolution and determine if they are peaceful or not. If it turns out that Marx’s own comprehension of revolution is indeed a violent one the next step will be to see if Korsch’s or Luckás’ adaptations of Marxism allow for a non-violent revolution. If, on the other hand, Marx’s own work is shown to be non-violent and compatible with peace, then my analysis will turn to the question of whether Luckás’ or Korsch’s Marxist philosophies turn Marxism into a violent doctrine. Marxism is an incredibly misinterpreted and misjudged philosophy despite its massive influence on history and other academic disciplines. If we are to ever truly understand why certain philosophies become so massive and influential, we must study them in an objective light that does justice to what these philosophies are really saying. I hope to contribute to this form of justice.

The panel will discuss Fitz-Gibbon’s forthcoming book: Pragmatic Nonviolence: Working Toward a Better World (Brill, 2021)

Book Blurb: Written in dialogue format, Andrew Fitz-Gibbon’s Pragmatic Nonviolence argues that nonviolence is the best hope for a better world. Human violence in all its forms—physical, psychological and systemic-cultural—is perhaps the greatest obstacle to well-being in personal and community life. Nonviolence as “a practice that, whenever possible, seeks the well-being of the Other, by refusing to use violence to solve problems, and by acting according to loving kindness” is the best antidote to human violence. By drawing on the philosophy of nonviolence, the American pragmatist tradition and recent empirical research, Pragmatic Nonviolence
demonstrates that, rather than being merely theoretical, nonviolence is a truly practical approach toward personal and community well-being.

**Gan Barry**  
Keynote Address:  
*Peace and Hope In Dark Times*  
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St. Bonaventure University

*These are dark times, but times have been dark for hundreds of years for many people on the planet, and at any given moment, there are always people experiencing dark times. Nonviolence, properly understood, points toward the actions that can bring light to darkness, These actions involve (1) focusing on means, (2) not making others worse off, (3) recognizing problems before they become crises, (4) working on improving oneself as one works to improve the world, and (5) aiming to reduce fear and resentment. Cultivation is the process underlying these actions. Cultivation teaches patience, counsels hope, and helps to establish peace.*

**Gay Bill**  
*Hope as a Moral Perspective: A Performative Language for Peace Activism in a Dark Time*  
wcgay@uncc.edu  
UNC Charlotte

*In these dark times, we need not—and should not—lose hope. We can forge a hopeful and effective practice of linguistic nonviolence and nonviolent social activism that avoids despair and that motivates us to continue the struggle even when obstacles seem almost too formidable and the way forward seems rather opaque. I utilize a language game approach introduced by Ranjit Chatterjee and apply it to discourse on hope as a moral perspective. On Chatterjee’s interpretation of the later Wittgenstein the meaning of a philosophy is the use made of it in society. In my application of this view, I contend the meaning of the language of “hope” is the use we make of it. Recently and all too often, we have been exposed to quite different and frequently dark language games that license and even motivate hate and physical violence. In response, I sketch how a language game of hope as a moral perspective can be used to initiate and sustain over the long haul nonviolent efforts for social justice.*

While I cite such recent philosophical works on hope as Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of Hope* and Richard Rorty’s *Philosophy and Social Hope* where Fishman develops an incisive and helpful interpretation of Dewey’s position on what he terms “moral hope.” Outside philosophy, I include practical insights from Rebecca Solnit’s Hope in the Dark and Terry Eagleton’s *Hope without Optimism* that support adopting hope as a moral perspective. I also discuss philosopher Jill Stauffer’s *Ethical Loneliness* in order to underscore challenges in acknowledging and facing the suffering of others when doing so is difficult and unpleasant.

I give examples of performative discourse that license hate and violence and examples of performative discourse that promote nonviolence and social justice. The former can lead to actions that damage or even destroy the future for some groups. The latter can lead to nonviolent actions that promote and advance a more emancipatory future for all. To support hope as a moral perspective, I include remarks by Martin Luther King, Jr., bell hooks, and Cornell West that illustrate performative discourse on moral hope. I emphasize that moral hope is based on possibility and duty and also on an intergenerational solidarity that continues even when the way forward seems dark and even bleak. Hopeful language and the actions following from it can provide a moral compass that points us toward steps that advance social justice. I conclude that, in its performative function, a discourse based on hope as a moral perspective serves especially well efforts to license and also motivate nonviolent action for peace and social justice.

**Gomez Manuela Alejandra**  
*Comment on Carlos Sanchez: A Sense of Brutality*  
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**Gordon Pierce**  
*National Democracy as a Promotor of Peace: An Critue*  
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There is a notion that democracy, as a possible bringer of peace through participation of individuals in
government, is limited to the local and direct rather than the national. One of the ways that democracy is
thought to be limited is that the virtue of fraternity is different than that of empathy. The idea of fraternity is
somewhat developed by Gregory Pappas in sections of his book John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience.
In this book Pappas traces the ethics of John Dewey and uses those ethics as the foundation of his own robust
democratic theory. In particular, he develops the idea that fraternal attachment is a driving virtue of democracy
to John Dewey’s theory. Pappas, however, does not discuss the other members of the Chicago school in the early
20th century and their views on ethics and democratic theory. In a way of providing a fuller understanding of
democratic theory, and the virtues that inform it to make the world a more peaceful place, I, in this paper,
discuss: John Dewey’s democratic theory; Pappas reading of Dewey’s ethics and Pappas’ subsequent democratic
theory; the thoughts of George Herbert Mead on meta-social theory; and Mitchell Aboulafia on Mead’s
conception of the cosmopolitan virtue for a peaceful democracy. I begin this process by introducing Pappas’
thoughts on fraternity and why it is a binding factor in the success of a local democracy. I then discuss how the
virtue of fraternity is problematic in the same ways and is able to be supplemented by Mead’s thought.
Specifically, I identify the problem in the virtue of fraternity as the virtue being limited to the local and direct. In
an effort to plug this hole, I then introduce Mead’s conception of the “me” and the “I” as a differing meta-theory
to the habit driven social theory of Dewey. In my discussion of the socially informed “me” I introduce Mitchell
Aboulafia’s book The Cosmopolitan Self: George Herbert Mead and Continental Philosophy. Through my
introduction of this work I develop how Mead’s conception of sympathy, as opposed to Dewey’s conception, as
found in Mead’s sociological conception of the self allows for the individual to transcend their physical
boundaries of fraternity and find cosmopolitan feelings for individuals everywhere through the abstraction of
their feelings over great distance. I conclude that democracy does not have to be limited to the local and direct
but, instead, can be informed by the local and direct and the feelings found in that location can be abstracted
and carried a great distance. In addition, with a fuller understanding of the “me” and “I” as discussed by Mead, it
is possible to have democratic peace on a much wider scale, because of the understanding of the abstraction of
the self-provided in Mead’s work.

REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM claims that all true moral principles of permissible warfare are reducible to true
moral principles that bind individuals. So, if it’s false, it is because some true moral principle of permissible
warfare is irreducible. One line of attack is to defend cases where only a group-level or collective principle
plausibly explains our ethical intuitions. Another, more modest, strategy is to identify cases where not only
individual level principles explain them. I have pursued the latter strategy, defending the mainstream view,
enshrined in the Geneva Convention, that the treatment of deactivated unjust combatants (and maybe, in some
cases, reactivated unjust combatants) by partisan or nonpartisan field medics is often all-things-considered
morally obligatory even if just combatants don’t consent to their treatment. Call this thesis TREATMENT. First, I
explain why reductive individualists like Helen Frowe deny TREATMENT with respect to what I call reactivated
unjust combatants, and then explain why they also have good reasons to deny TREATMENT with respect to
deactivated unjust combatants. S is a reactivated combatant just in case, were S to receive medical treatment,
then S would reassume the moral equivalent of their prior combatant status; and S is a deactivated combatant
just in case, were S to receive medical treatment, S wouldn’t reassume the moral equivalent of their prior
combatant status. Second, I develop a novel defense TREATMENT. A plausible principle, GROUP RISK, entails that
war crimes committed by particular members of the group, while reasonably avoidable for individuals, are (to a
real extent) not so for groups: For any war W declared by state S: If S is justified in declaring W, reasonably
foressees some combatants will culpably harm nonliable parties in W, but S can’t reasonably prevent them by
virtue of the large number of combatants, then the foreseen harms to nonliable parties are group-unavoidable
(and group-justified) but not (fully) individual-unavoidable (or individual-justified). So, the justification for
permitting them is collective but not individual. GROUP RISK, in turn, implies that states and military hierarchies
are responsible for vetting and enforcing the moral responsibilities of their combatants, as well as making repairs when their combatants fail in those responsibilities. One unfortunate empirical fact of warfare is that unjustified harms both to nonliable civilians and unjust combatants are undercounted. States thus have good reason to treat all unjust combatants, including (at least in some cases) reactivated ones. So, TREATMENT is true and satisfies the irreducibility criterion. So, REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM is false.

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The philosophical discourse on immigration seldom contains mention of the extraordinary efforts and sacrifices that migrants make to secure a better life for themselves and their communities. I aim to explain how virtue ethics can play a substantial role in deepening our concern for the hardships that migrants overcome, and for understanding how virtue enables migration justice.

Given that virtue ethics proceeds by examining the virtuous person, we should ask how it can guide action in a way that meaningfully affects migration policy. I explore this concern, and recommend that we resist forming a kind of ‘virtue theory of justice’ that hopes to state the precise ends of migration justice in policy form. Indeed, philosophers have already taken up these theoretical approaches to migration, and broadly speaking, the result is either nationalism or cosmopolitanism. Where virtue ethics is distinguished from its utilitarian and deontological counterparts is in its attention to ethical practice, where justice as a virtue is taken to be an ongoing process of development sensitive to situational changes, as opposed to an end in policy.

In particular, virtue ethics may initiate a call for self-reflection—to reexamine how individuals and states facilitate human flourishing. In circumstances of injustice, virtue ethics is uniquely suited to describe how certain vices obstruct justice, as much as virtues promote it. Historically, the people we regard as virtuous were able to reveal serious vices in their oppressors. For example, Gandhi’s call for non-violent protests was met with British officers opening fire on a group of unarmed civilians in the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. To take another example, the humble protest of Rosa Parks to refuse to give up her seat to a white passenger was met with undignified treatment in her arrest and charge for an unrelated crime. The commitment that moral exemplars have to justice can highlight the various ways that others are impediments to justice, and virtue ethics calls for us—individuals and states—to consider whether we are acting as impediments.

My paper has two specific goals. First, I intend to show how migrants’ virtues are uniquely responsive to the conditions that motivate migration. I do this by considering four virtues: courage, hope, dignity, and humility. Second, I discuss how these virtues uncover parallel vices that obstruct migration justice: recklessness, pessimism, disrespect, and improper pride. While these vices are often present in migrants’ country of origin, they are also found in the Western liberal democracies that receive migrants. And though it is clear that individuals may possess these vices (for instance, in harboring certain racist or ethno-centric attitudes) states are also reckless or disrespectful in their policies: migrants experience extreme wait times to live and work, they are detained in inhospitable conditions, and they often cannot reunite with loved ones in their target country. Western liberal democracies and their citizens could do more to remedy these vices, and to live up to the standard of virtue set by many migrants in their path to just treatment.

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<th>Aristotle Revisited: Hybrid Regimes, Nominal Transformation, and the “Sense” of Injustice</th>
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Abstract: Starting in the late twentieth century, democratization theory faced something of a crisis. Following numerous failed democratic transitions in countries around the world, Western political theorists were forced to revisit previously held beliefs about how and why authoritarian regimes transition to democracy. At the same time, theorists were tasked with explaining the ever-growing emergence of hybrid regimes, or governments composed of both autocratic and democratic features. Political theorists were struck by the relative durability of these regimes; while the road to democratization had once been characterized as a relatively linear process, hybrid regimes proved incredibly effective at maintaining long periods of political stasis. What’s more, the
Corruption in hybrid regimes exemplifies what Reva Siegel calls “preservation-through-transformation,” wherein status-enforcing state action evolves over time as it is contested (Siegel 1997, 1113). Such processes of nominal transformation pose significant questions for political philosophers and theorists alike: how do unjust regimes use political transformation in order to preserve the status quo, and how might real change be achieved? Responding to these questions, I suggest we turn to an unlikely source for answers: the political philosophy of Aristotle. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s Politics may help us better understand the role affect plays in democratic regime transitions, or more specifically, in regimes’ failure to transition. Focusing on Aristotle’s description of the tyrant, I suggest that Aristotle anticipates much of the phenomena observable in modern-day hybrid regimes, including the use of what political scientists call “democratic safety-valves.” Reading Aristotle together with Michelle Alexander and Martin Luther King Jr., I demonstrate how corrupt regimes engage in nominal processes of transformation so as to stave off political upheaval without actually establishing any deep, routinized commitments to justice. Just as Aristotle’s tyrant utilizes the “sense” of justice to maintain power, so too do corrupt governments utilize preservation-through-transformation in order to maintain the status quo. Ultimately, I hold that Aristotle’s Politics proves fruitful not only to theories of democratic transition, but also to theories of state preservation both broadly construed and related to our particular political moment.

Kendall Jerry

Peace & Hope in Hard Times - Towards a World with Neither Victims Nor Executioners

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Hannah Arendt has written of life in dark times: brief studies of how different persons acted in the face of systemic evil. This paper suggests another chapter be added: the work of Andre and Magda Trocme, the Village of Le Chambon, and other villages on the same plateau are important pieces of the mosaic of peace and justice activism. They lived, preached, and wrote about hiding and steering to safety thousands of Jewish children and others during the Nazi occupation of Vichy France. Their view was neither a utopian optimism nor paralyzing pessimism. Rather, it was one of active engagement with evil, recognizing the inevitability of, even necessity for conflict. But the struggle would not be about victory, but about witness to a set of VALUES. This paper will briefly discuss the values the Trocmes tried to live by.

1 - These start with human SOLIDARITY. It takes a Village. In this situation many villages, schools and churches. In this situation it was significant that the people of the plateau had a vivid memory of their Heugonaut heritage as a persecuted people. The human heart must be liberated from the myths of Robinson Crusoe and Horatio Alger. That is not enough. Institutions also have to be changed or even the best of intentions will be crushed under their weight.

2 - TRUTH with a capital T, but also truth with a lowercase “t”. Trocme’s truths were Christian, but his understanding of reality can be and has been de-christianized, even secularized. Much of the activity of the central European dissidents in the 80s living as if they were in a free society (eg., Havel, Michnik, Konrad) can be seen as secularized examples of the Trocme’s way.

3 - Living as if one were free begins in the ORDINARY; with the routines of daily life. When, for instance, someone comes to one’s door, one feels responsible. It is recognized that both the person in the doorway and the person who responded to the knock are affected by the response whether positive or negative.

4 - This focus on each INDIVIDUAL, both message and method, can be summed up as an ethic of rescue. Or as Magda Trocme saw the circumstances, she was helping Jews rather than resisting Vichy and the Nazis. The Trocme’s ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE was a way of being part of a healing community. To save someone was to restore that person physically, socially, and spiritually. To neglect this restoration was already to kill.

CONCLUSION: If one hopes for a world of peace and justice, perhaps the Trocme’s ethic of rescue is a place to begin. It is neither easy nor without risk. And importantly it is not an ethic of absolutes. But it may be the best way to get one closer to Camus’ ideal that there be "neither victims nor executioners."
### Kling Jennifer

**Uncivil Obedience: A Method for (Potentially) Decreasing Political Polarization**

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A common lamentation about political polarization is that it decreases social and political civility. Family members disown each other over political affiliations, protestors flood the streets, and social disavowals become part of everyday life. Polarization increases incivility, which increases polarization, in what appears to be a vicious cycle. However, I argue that there is one kind of political incivility, namely, uncivil obedience, that has the ability to decrease polarization. Uncivil obedience has the capacity to decrease polarization by drawing attention to the ways in which neither the political left nor the political right have consistent sets of social and political views. By encouraging people to see the inconsistencies within the polarized left and the polarized right, uncivil obedience can draw people away from polarization as a social and political practice.

Uncivil obedience—also sometimes called malicious compliance—is when a person or an organization undermines the law by obeying the law *precisely*. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense successfully stalled President Trump’s 2017 decision to bar transgender persons from serving in the U.S. military for over 2 years, simply by requiring that all bureaucratic policies, procedures, and addendums surrounding such a policy change be followed to the letter. By enforcing the labyrinthine web of laws surrounding broad military policy changes, the Dept. of Defense seriously undermined Trump’s ban. They conspicuously followed the law, and in so doing, registered their disagreement with, and protest of, the proposed policy.

Much like its close cousin civil disobedience, uncivil obedience draws attention to socio-political dissonance. But whereas civil disobedience accentuates the discrepancies between a whole society’s socio-political ideals and its practices, uncivil obedience accentuates the discrepancies between particular views within a political group or side. For instance, the case above draws out the dissonance between two common views within the political right: “just follow the law” and “just use common sense.” By underscoring such inconsistencies, usually in clever, ironic ways, uncivil obedience can help people to see that perhaps they ought not be so wedded to any particular political group or side, and so can operate to decrease political polarization within a society.

### Lal Sanjay

**Broadening the Category of Moral Injury to Better Grasp the Wrong of Violence**

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Violence, among a significant segment of peace theorists, is conceived in terms of actions that impede the ability of others to thrive. While I do not dispute the viability of this conception I will seek to draw attention to complications brought about for it by Stoic thought. Specifically, I will discuss the above conception in regard to the standard Stoic notion that what others do can never really impact one’s own well-being and thus her ability to thrive. I take the development of the traditional Stoic quality of equanimity to be central to creating a peaceful social order. However, I also wish to preserve the aforementioned understanding of violence (an understanding which clearly implies that events external to the individual are capable of impacting her well-being). In my synthesis below I will incorporate insights provided by certain bio-centric environmental philosophers that relate to different categories of welfare. Ultimately, I hope to show that applying a kind of bio-centric framework to understanding harm holds great promise for attempts to bolster arguments of peace philosophers.

### Solomon Lalaye

**Between the Government and the Governed in the Quest for Sustainable Peace in Africa: The Polarity of Existence**

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The social contract between the government and the governed in any society is fundamentally premised on the attainment of peace at both individual and social levels of human existence. Consequently, individuals concede some rights to the government in exchange for peace and tranquility, security and prosperity while, the
government demands allegiance and loyalty from the governed. Unfortunately, African countries, since independence has continued to experience separatist ethnic and religious conflicts, active armed insurgencies, kidnapping, large scale poverty, diseases and different forms of injustice, all of which singly or cumulatively are inimical to the attainment of individual peace and the peace of the society in general. This situation suggests disconnect in the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of either or both of the government and the governed. Fundamental to this disconnect and threat to sustainable peace is the inability of successive governments in most of the African states to act in ways that transcend class, party, ethnic and religious backgrounds with a view to ensuring justice and fairness among the heterogeneous groups that constitute their respective states. Aptly put, the absence of value orientation that promotes and protects humanity in general, as against narrow-minded values that placed emphasis on the self and smaller groups, dominate and isolate the ruling class. This encourages corruption, nepotism and other moral vices. It also endanger fair and equitable investment in critical infrastructure like education, health care, science and technology that would mitigate the factors that predisposed the governed to actions that threaten individual and social peace of the society.

In the same vein, the governed have weakened the moral voice of the society through inactive participation in governance. This complacent dispositions of the governed has attracted them more to their ethnic enclaves rather than the national government, thus widening the gap between the governed and the government. The presence of the moral voice would espoused the shared moral consciousness exemplified by the philosophical thoughts of Ubuntu, Omoluwabi and Ujaama ethos which encourage adherence to exemplar and edifying moral behaviours rather than the violations of them. Therefore, the paper employed the analytic and prescriptive approaches of the qualitative methods of research, using Nigeria and some few African nations as a point of departure to argue for the reconstruction of the moral infrastructure of the African society as a panacea to enduring peace. This would consequently re-enact the loss virtues that promote peace which the governments and the governed have discarded in contemporary time.

Layton Dakota
Fake News in the Information Age: The Challenges it Poses for Peace
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One of the sharpest splinters in our effort to foster peace and hope in these dark times is the phenomenon known as “truth-decay.” After the polarizing 2020 Presidential election between the incumbent Republican Donald Trump and his Democratic challenger former Vice President Joe Biden, Trump’s predecessor, President Barack Obama gave an interview to CBS’s Scott Pelley on the television program 60 Minutes to promote his new memoir A Promised Land. In this interview, President Obama defined truth-decay as, “the sense that not only do we not have to tell the truth, but the truth doesn’t even matter.” Truth-decay is an unfortunate symptom of the mass spread of misinformation through social media outlets and other mediums of communication known as “fake news”. The Associated Press defines fake news as “deliberately false stories that appear to come from credible, journalistic sources...designed to be spread around the internet — previously as jokes, but increasingly often, to influence political opinion.” This poses significant challenges for peace as it is defined by UNESCO’s former Director-General Irina Bokova: “Peace is more than the absence of war, it is living together with our differences — of sex, race, language, religion or culture – while furthering universal respect for justice and human rights on which such coexistence depends.”

There are two ethical commitments that we must make if we accept Bokova’s definition of peace: I. A tolerance for differences in sex, race, language, religion and culture, and II. A universal respect for justice and human rights. The former requires us to be open-minded and receptive to those who are different from us through social engagement. The latter requires us to be committed to the universal truths of justice and human rights.

In this essay, I will demonstrate how fake news hinders our ability to uphold these ethical commitments and propose a solution to this dilemma. First, I will argue that the public panic over fake news has led people to seal themselves in information echo chambers that shuts them off from social engagement with others who are different from them and demonstrate how this has led to social discord. Second, I will impress upon the importance of teaching citizens the proper critical thinking skills that would enable them to thoughtfully engage with the mass amount of information and discern real news from the fake news that hinders their ability to uphold the universal truths of justice and human rights. Third, I will argue that an educated citizenry is vital to
Concerned Philosophers for Peace  
Conference Program

restoring the currently eroding public trust in mainstream media sources and illustrate why this is critical for the preservation of democratic institutions and social harmony.

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Huntington’s (in)famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* has met with numerous critiques since its first publication in 1996, but the worldview it represents and has helped to shape is still exerting considerable influence on political decision makers. His prediction that, the critical distinctions between people in the post-Cold War world are not primarily ideological or economic; but cultural, seems to have been proven true by conflicts occurred in the first two decades of the 21st century: the increasing importance of identity-politics, violence inspired by religious radicalism, enhanced tensions between Western democratic countries and countries like Russia and China. However, one should be extremely careful with predictions of this nature. Politics is not a natural science that can be predicted on the basis of natural laws, politics falls within the realm of human action and therefore is motivated by subjective intentions and worldviews of the agents. Huntington’s conception of different cultures clashing with each other is a certain worldview that generates conflict and war. He talks about “we” and “them” and thereby, he already divides people into friends and foes. For the sake and maintenance of world peace, a more productive and humanist view of culture and history is of eminent importance. Karl Jaspers’s postwar philosophical reflections were made out of concern for a troubled time when humanity itself was endangered, we see ourselves facing the same crisis 70 years later. For Jaspers, different cultures have the same transcendent origin, mankind are not separated by mutually incompatible cultures and value-systems, instead, each different culture is a concrete realization of the same and one origin in time and space. Different cultures should be in dialog and communication with each other, because only by seeing the identity of oneself in the otherness, we can develop our humanity toward a transcendent totality. His conception of the “Axial Age” regards cultures rising on the Eurasia continent between 800 and 200 BC as the same spiritual experience by man of “absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and in the lucidity of transcendence” (*The Origin and Goal of History*, 1953). Axial Age is Jasper’s foundation for a political ethics of post-war Europe and the post-colonial global world. In his conception of world history and world philosophy, different cultures are related to each other not as “we” and “them”, but as “we” and “you”, in this dialogical relationship, chance for friendship is implied and enmity can be avoided. With this alternative worldview offered by Jaspers’ humanism, political agents as human beings with subjective motivations and nations represented by them are more prone to install peace and friendly relationship with each other. In a kindred spirit, the Chinese Confucian philosopher Tang Yijie (1927-2014) introduced the term “new axial age” into contemporary political discourse in China. He called for a mutual understanding and tolerance between different cultures. After all, the possibility of world peace lies within the consciousness of our authentic human existence.

Lucas Michael  
*Justice in the Ecophenomenological Battle for Cerrito Peak*  
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Place is an evocative subject, where location-gathers-world via lived experiences in Heidegger’s thinking. The intersubjective nature of cultures creates simultaneous realities knitted by differing maps of what appears in layered sediments of place, which under certain circumstances, come into conflict, especially when competing cultural realities are based upon paradigms of objectivist science, abstract ideals of property, or sacred/spiritual teaching. These anthropocentric roads to place may be further informed/deformed by ecophenomenological thinking, as espoused by David Abram and Ted Toadvine, and speculative realist positions put forward by Graham Harman, Timothy Morton and others. The presentation provides a specific place-based focus for how these competing forms of Continental thinking provide lenses to view the battle for what is considered place, and what is considered real, for public attention, codification, and future agency and praxis.

Cerrito Peak is a eucalyptus crowned rocky hilltop within the coastal village of Morro Bay, California, with dramatic sweeping vistas over the Morro Bay estuary, and twenty-mile segment of the Pacific Coast called Estero...
Bay. In popular practice, it is a public place, accessed via steep ‘paper’ streets by the adventurous seeking solitude, or to engage in the spectrum of activities engendered from the dramatic setting. In time, a seventy foot tall eucalyptus grove, planted to shield against winds and provide a possible lumber source [which failed], has become dwelling for migrating endangered Monarch butterflies, and the endangered Peregrine Falcon, introducing a new, invasive, ecological dynamic. Officially, in the abstract, it is a private parcel that was thought undevelopable, until the City of Morro Bay granted a parcel owner formerly public rights-of-way to build a seemingly impossible dwelling. Publically, due to religious rights of privacy, aspects of Eagle Rock [the English translation of the Chumash slo’w irek, their indigenous name for Cerrito Peak] must be represented with necessarily ambiguity, but are acknowledged to encompass a ceremonial shrine sequence for the Northern Chumash people, in continuing use for thousands of years, and also by later-arriving Playano Salinan people. While the initially city found in favor of development, subsequent appeals and testimony by environmentalists, the Northern Chumash Tribal Council, non-profits groups, neighbors and concerned citizens resulted in a court decision for a requisite full environmental impact statement for the project, what had been desired at the beginning of the developer’s efforts. The resolution involved the owner selling the parcel back to the City at a lowered price and held by the City pending a new organization forming and buying the property to be held as open space.

The presentation reviews the setting, contexts and descriptions in evidence presented at public hearings and in subsequent legal proceedings, and discusses place in light of competing, combative systems of the real: property and indigenous religious rights, ecological, instrumental, and transgenerational ethics, and community-based aesthetics, in linkages to similarly competing Continental models of thinking. The presentation cast light upon the burdens when bridging reflection and practice.

McClarence Shoshana  
*The Limits of Freedom: Intersectional Constraints Toward a Peaceful Life*

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In Hindu philosophy, infinitely across the sky, and at every knot in the net, Indra has a jewel. When light is cast on Indra’s net, the light reflects in each and every jewel infinitely. The net itself signifies the interconnectivity of the world and the relationships between not only humans but between humans, animals, and objects. The jewels reflecting this light are multifaceted and thus can be taken to represent the intersectionality of the human self: a person’s race, class, gender, and sexuality amongst other aspects (Loy, “Indra’s Postmodern Net”, 481). While these facets can lend to a brighter jewel and lend to an individual’s pursuit of human flourishing, they can also make it far more difficult to pursue and find tranquility in an innately unjust world. Leading peaceful lives it not merely a question of will but rather a confluence of obstacles. This essay considers the obstacles of environment, socioeconomic factors, class, race, gender, and sexuality through the lens of mysticism. It first explores how oppressors complicate the interconnectivity of the world by creating injustice through manipulation of power dynamics. In an effort to surmount these obstacles this paper focuses on mysticism of unity, or interconnectivity, that allows not only the oppressed by the oppressors to move toward liberative philosophies (Browning, “William James’s Philosophy of Mysticism”, 57). It then discusses how the pursuit of a fulfilling life is made far more difficult for some than others, thinking about the confines of freedom (de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 65). In doing so, this essay seeks to defeat the narrative that people are simply unwilling to live peaceful lives by replacing it with one in which people actively strive towards a fulfilling life and thus in the act flourish. This paper will finish by examining the harmful stereotypes of minorities as violent and consider the implications of systems that limit freedom for some by acquiring power and privilege for others.

Merriam Garret  
*The Dilemma of Peaceful Fascism*

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Fascism is notoriously difficult to define rigidly and comprehensively. Many scholars opt for a Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’ approach to understanding fascism, rather than a set of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions.’ But nearly all conceptions of fascism identify military expansion and conquest as common, if not
ubiquitous among fascist regimes. Not all fascists regimes wear uniform-colored shirts, but they do all seem to lay claim to their neighbor’s land on flimsy pretenses. Or at least they used to. While both Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany were famously bellicose, the resurgence of fascism in the 21st century somewhat complicates this pattern. Of the eight contemporary nation-states that Madeleine Albright singles out for chapter-length assessments in her book Fascism: A Warning only one has successfully engaged in expansionist military engagements, and that one (Russia) has done so on a comparatively small scale. Why, if these nations are at least flirting with fascism, haven’t we seen more militarism from them?

One possible answer to this question is that the fascist elements within these states have not yet progressed to the relevant stage in which military expansion is either viable or desirable. But on Robert Paxton’s “five stages of fascism” scale, at least 6 of Albright’s states seem to qualify for the 4th stage (exercise of power), which is traditionally where military expansion begins. Another possibility is that Albright is too permissive in her ‘warnings.’ Paxton would likely argue that the lack of military conquest among these nations disqualifies them from being properly labeled ‘fascist’.

In response to this, I will argue two key points. First, Paxton’s ‘conservative’ use of the label ‘fascism’ is mistaken; it is at least tentatively appropriate to consider some of the nations on Albright’s list to be fascist. They meet many of the hallmarks of Umberto Eco’s ‘Ur-fascism’, as well as many of Paxton’s own criteria. And second, the proper explanation for fascism’s ‘inward turn’ is not conceptual, but geopolitical. The post-World War II global order (NATO, the UN, nuclear proliferation, etc.) has made military expansion too risky and too costly, even for (would be) fascist regimes. The moment any modern state marches across its neighbor’s borders for the purpose of annexation they run the risk of a global counter attack, akin to what Iraq experienced when they attempted to lay claim to Kuwait in 1990.

If this is correct the interests of peace face a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the inability of fascist regimes to conquer and absorb new territories severely limits their ability to threaten world peace, an obvious boon. But on the other hand, preventing military expansion likely will not, by itself, curb developing fascist movements. If fascist regimes are learning how to tame their expansionist impulses and instead focus their aggression on ‘internal’ enemies, the international community will be far less equipped and less motivated to check growing fascist movements abroad. How should those of us committed to peace respond to such ‘peaceful fascism’?

What does peace activism look like under conditions of polarization? In 1946-47, Henry Stuart Nelson, the influential Dean of Religion at Howard University took a year of leave to work in Kolkata during a time of partition riots. Nelson spoke with Gandhi and accompanied the Mahatma on peace-making excursions. Then Nelson addressed Kolkata University on the Bases of World Understanding: an inquiry into the means of resolving racial, religious, class, and national misapprehensions and conflicts. Nelson’s pluralistic method of peace and understanding for polarized times, culminates in what we will call “the hard problem of pluralism,” when peace activists assert that truth, pluralistically conceived, demands change in others.

The prospects of peace and stability in the world today are constantly undercut by violent conflicts, natural disasters, economic failures, political upheavals, and social unrest. In short, the world that we live in isn’t a secure place, especially for the most vulnerable people. While it is true that climate change contributes to many of the afore mentioned factors that cause human insecurity, the link between climate change and human security isn’t a straightforward one. This paper, in that light, is an attempt to explore the ways in which climate change impacts human security and may be a contributing factor in violent conflicts.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlights at least a couple of ways in which climate change fosters risks to human security. One of them is through economic impacts. Highlighting the significance of the economic impacts of climate change, IPCC maintains, “Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent
conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks.” The second way is through the potential threat that climate change poses due to its impacts on the “critical infrastructure and territorial integrity of many states.” Climate change is, therefore, believed to influence national economic and security policies, and those policies may lead to violent conflicts. There are other ways in which climate change poses risks to human security. For instance, political geographers Jon Bennet and Neil Ager point out that changes in the political economy of energy resources, as countries attempt to reduce emissions from fossil fuels, may lead to a scramble of resources, which in turn may lead to violent conflicts. Furthermore, they argue that climate change may lead to violent conflicts through the changes in social systems driven by actual or perceived climate impacts. The emphasis here is on the changes in social institutions and relationships that exist between groups and individuals because of actual and perceived climate impacts.

The aspects that are highlighted by IPCC and Bennet and Ager are important but there is a need to dig deeper to understand how climate change indeed increases the risk of violent conflicts and threatens human security, which I will attempt in this paper. The underlying argument of this paper is that the implications of climate change seep through all areas of life and that they threaten a peaceful coexistence in the world and that it is important to combat climate change in order to preserve human security. By preserving human security, which embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict, we will be able to foster conditions that allow for peace in the world.

Nagel          Mechthild  Comment on Andrew Fitz-Gibbon  nagelm@cortland.edu  SUNY Cortland

Comment on Andrew Fitz-Gibbon...

Neal          Anthony  Gandhi, Thurman and the Question of Aim  aneal@philrel.msstate.edu  Mississippi State University

ABSTRACT FORTHCOMING...

Orosco        Jose-Antonio  Chair: Carlos Sanchez Panel  joseph.orosco@oregonstate.edu  Oregon State University

Park          John  Meritocratic Democracy Over Democracy & Epistocracy for Minority Rights  john.park@csus.edu  California State University, Sacramento

I contend that a hybrid meritocratic democracy is better than democracy and epistocracy for minority rights. I propose a new development in democratic thought in that a democracy fused with a meritocracy is better than other forms of democracy for minority rights.

Jason Brennan argues against democracy in significant part by relying on political science studies demonstrating that the public largely is politically ignorant and has various cognitive biases that make democracy unreliable. In response, Brennan posits an epistocracy, which is rule of the knowledgeable. Political power is distributed according to competence, where for example, those who have greater political knowledge can have votes that carry greater weight.

As the data shows that socially advantaged groups in the U.S., like wealthy Caucasians, generally have more political knowledge than minority groups, Brennan anticipates the objection that for an epistocratic democracy, advantaged groups will have more voting power over others. Thus, we will have unfair policies favoring the advantaged. Brennan responds by writing that experiments show that minority groups are unlikely to know how to promote their own interests and that advantaged groups mostly vote for their perceived national good, which benefits minorities.

I object to Brennan because new studies show that high information voters actually don’t agree on a variety of issues. Rather, they vote based on their tribal affiliations. Democracies are not about individuals having the
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
Conference Program

power to vote and put forth their own policy preferences. Rather, democracies are really about political parties and identity groups along with their group agendas. Given that high information voters succumb to tribalism, we can’t rely on them to always pick good candidates.

I advocate a specified version of a meritocracy, or rule by the merited, that’s hybridized with democracy as it can better handle the empirical data against a democracy. Moreover, unlike an epistocracy, this meritocratic democracy can better account for minority rights. A meritocracy screens for merit in candidates while an epistocracy screens for knowledge in voters. With my hybrid, in order to run for office at the national level, there will be education, non-ideological-based testing, and experience requirements in local government. For instance, a candidate must show that they had low hate crime numbers when holding office at the local level. Those many who pass the requirements then must be elected by democratic vote.

I contend that my hybrid does better than other democratic-based theories in that, although not foolproof, it’s more likely to have virtuous officials than democracy in light of the social science data since only those who have demonstrated sufficient merit can run for office. It also is able to address minority rights better than an epistocratic democracy in that elected officials will have provided good reason to believe they’re meritorious regarding minority rights.

Poe Danielle  
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University of Dayton

As our lives (including this conference) have largely migrated to virtual meetings, classes, and conferences, I’m asking for your indulgence as I reflect on the careful staging of background and appearance that goes into these virtual interactions, as well as the disruptions of that staging. By thinking about these interactions, we can learn something about privilege and structural injustice. My hope is that this moment can be an opportunity to dismantle some of the injustice that surrounds us.

Staging: When I’m taking part in an online meeting, I tend to use background pictures (of the university and of the natural world), my favorite wall of art in my house, and my backyard. Each of these is intended to reveal part of who I am: my professional self (faculty and administrator), my hobbies and interests (hiking, kayaking, and photography), and my home. But, these each also disguise parts of my life that I’d rather keep private.

Disruption: No matter how carefully, I stage and plan my appearance; there have been those moments when parts of my private life disrupt those constructions. Yet, what those moments of disruption reveal is that I have enormous privilege. For others, the pandemic has reinforced structural injustice.

Dismantling Structural Injustice: The final section will analyze the work of black feminists (including Treva B. Lindsey, Jennifer C. Nash, Britteny Cooper, and Rachel Alicia Griffin) to analyze white women’s participation in structural racism and opportunities to restructure that relationship into allyship and anti-racism.

Presbey Gail  
*Gandhi’s Distinct Contribution to Nonviolent Strategy and Tactics, as Enacted by Subsequent Activists*  
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University of Detroit Mercy

ABSTRACT FORTHCOMING...

Rehman Rashad  
*Amor est causa pacis: A Pieperian Reading of Aquinas’ Theory of Peace*  
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The University of Toronto

To modern readers, the statement “love is the cause of peace” is apt to be regarded either as a pithy, sloganized truism of a more hopeful, distant past where, in a world not able to destroy itself by its own devices, we were able to speak of love and peace in the same breath; or, instead, we view it as the bedrock upon which a just society is procured. Again, it might be questioned whether in a pluralistic society we will agree on what
“love” and “peace” mean, and whether — therefore — these various, conflicting meanings could — even in principle — have effective socio-political application. To the one who simply rejects the legitimacy of love and peace in the modern world, it should be noted that talk of peace is not avoidable, for ordinary English is saturated with “peace-talk” e.g., “peaceful protests”, “religions of peace”, “peaceful politics”, “making peace with someone”, “peace offerings”, et cetera. Notwithstanding possible reactions evoked by “love is the cause of peace”, it might surprise the modern reader that the quote which began and entitles this paper is from the Medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on the Gospel of John, and is consequently a translation of Aquinas’ Latin “amor...est causa pacis.” (14, 7). In context, Aquinas is commenting on The Gospel of John 14:27 in which Jesus says the following: “Peace I leave with you, my peace I give to you, not as the world gives do I give to you. Let not your heart be troubled, nor let it be afraid.” (Εἰρήνην ἀφίημι ὑμῖν, εἰρήνην τὴν ἐμὴν δίδωμι ὑμῖν· οὐ καθὼς ὁ κόσμος δίδωσιν ἐγὼ δίδωμι ὑμῖν. μὴ ταρασσάσθω ὑμῶν ἡ καρδία μηδὲ δειλιάτω). In Thomistic fashion, Aquinas’ commentary on John 14:27 reveals an important investment in the theory of peace (in Koine Greek εἰρήνην, and in Latin pax), providing a definition of peace (14, 7, 1962), a distinction between two kinds of peace (14, 7, 1962; 14, 7, 1963; 14, 7, 1964), a threefold layout of peace predicated upon human nature (14, 7, 1962), as well as the attainment of “true peace” (pax vera) and the perfection of peace (14, 7, 1964). This paper has two aims. First, it unpacks Aquinas’ notion of peace in his commentary on John 14:27, which is centred around the definition, kinds and possibility of a perfected peace, as well as how love is the cause of peace (and for Aquinas this explication and explanation will be both theological and philosophical). Second, it aims to make plausible Aquinas’ explication of peace by contextualizing Aquinas’ theory of peace within his writings on love (especially as Josef Pieper reads the Thomistic account of love), and thereby show how Aquinas’ theory of peace fares in comparison with modern accounts of peace. I conclude this work by suggesting how Aquinas’ theory of peace might be applied successfully in a pluralistic context which aims at the collective goal of social justice.

Rentmeester Casey

| Trump’s Dangerous Authoritarian Ideology | casey.rentmeester@belincollege.edu | Bellin College lincollege.edu |

The United States is at a crossroads. In recent decades, it didn’t much matter whether the president was a democrat or a republican: the results were slightly different but very much the same. The democrats championed more social programs and the republicans took more of a free market stance, but in the end society grooved into familiar contours. Trump’s presidency has changed all of that by entering us into the dangerous territory of authoritarianism.

The author begins by differentiating authoritarianism with totalitarianism. In totalitarianism, the ruler has total control over the citizens, while in authoritarianism, the ruler disregards truth and pursues power by any means necessary. Using examples, the author argues that while Trump sometimes seems to think he has total rule, he is best labeled as an authoritarian.

One of the common characteristics of authoritarianism and totalitarianism is their reliance upon ideology. Hannah Arendt states that ideology has succeeded when people have lost contact with each other and the reality around them such that the distinction between fact and fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist. For Arendt, ideology is invoked by sowing doubt into authorities so as to create a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied upon. Trump has proven himself to be a master of ideology: he rejects science, as can be seen clearly with his response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as his environmentally destructive policies that fly in the face of the stark reality of climate change; he sows doubt into any media outlet that doesn’t align with his interests; and his overarching emphasis on law and order after the unjust killing of George Floyd and shooting of Jacob Blake blatantly prioritizes politics over respect for human dignity.

The dangerous thing about ideology is not that one person is delusional: the danger, rather, lies in the ability to garner disciples who buy into the rhetoric and act accordingly. Louis Althusser coins the term “interpellation” to explain this process. If ideological manipulation works “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that ... he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e., in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself.’” Upon outlining Althusser’s concept, the author argues that Trump supporters who deny the existence of climate change, as California wildfires burn relentlessly, and who refuse to wear masks during a pandemic, as the U.S. deaths outpace every other country, have all been interpellated in Althusser’s
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Conference Program

The author then uses Kyle Rittenhouse, the teenage suspect of the recent Kenosha shootings, who has been front row at Trump rallies and has a social media feed filled with “Blue Lives Matter” as a demonstration of the danger involved in ideology. Using Johan Galtung’s conception of positive peace, that is, social systems that promote human flourishing, the author ends by finding hope in the Black Lives Matter movement and increasing interest in a Green New Deal.

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<th>Salzberger Macy M.</th>
<th>The Moral Harms of Domestic Violence</th>
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In this paper, I distinguish between two kinds of moral harm I argue are characteristically suffered by victims of domestic violence: moral damage and moral injury. Moral damage occurs when the ability to develop or sustain good moral character has been compromised by an agent’s circumstances. In sexist societies, for example, women are often expected to act servilely or deferentially. Because these traits of character represent a kind of moral deficiency, we can say that women are vulnerable to moral damage in sexist societies. Similarly, victims of domestic violence are expected to act servilely and submissively. I argue, then, that victims of domestic violence are vulnerable to moral damage.

In addition to moral damage, I argue that victims often suffer from what I follow scholars of war in calling moral injury. Moral injury refers to the moral angst that follows from when an individual causes or becomes causally implicated in actions that we ordinarily would understand to be morally grievous offenses. In war, for example, soldiers often suffer from moral injury when they feel guilt, shame, or regret for committing actions in the line of duty that we would ordinarily oppose, even if justified in the context of war. Soldiers may also suffer moral angst when they are causally implicated in serious harms to their peers, even when they are not at fault. In contexts of domestic violence, perpetrators often enlist victims in committing wrongdoing, such as enlisting victims in child abuse or neglect. Victims thereby suffer from moral injury because they must suffer with the guilt, shame, or regret of becoming implicated in seriously wrongful actions. Whether or not the victim is in fact at fault for her implication, her actions are nevertheless appropriate occasions for some kind of moral angst.

Finally, I argue that by recognizing the differences in the moral harms suffered by victims, we are better prepared to care for victims and respond to those moral harms. Moral damage and moral injury are very different experiences. A victim who suffers from moral injury may not suffer from a deficient moral character; she may be an exceptionally virtuous person who is faced with only morally regrettable options. By appreciating the differences in the moral experiences of the victim, we become better positioned to identify strategies for responding to or repairing the different harms they suffer. For example, in addition to looking at what philosophers of oppression have said about cultivating liberatory virtues, we can look to literature in philosophy of war for guidance on how to care for victims of moral injury. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, by recognizing the different experiences of victims, we are better prepared to give voice to and acknowledge the complexity of the harms they suffer.

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<th>Sanchez Carlos</th>
<th>A Sense of Brutality: Philosophy After Narco-Culture</th>
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A panel will discuss Sanchez’s new book: A Sense of Brutality: Philosophy After Narco-Culture (Amherst College Press, 2020)

Abstract: Contemporary popular culture is riddled with references to Mexican drug cartels, narcos, and drug trafficking. In the United States, documentary filmmakers, journalists, academics, and politicians have taken note of the increasing threats to our security coming from a subculture that appears to feed on murder and brutality while being fed by a romanticism about power and capital. In this book, I use Mexican narco-culture as a point of departure for thinking about the nature and limits of violence, culture, and personhood. I argue that violent cultural modalities, of which narco-culture is but one, call into question our understanding of “violence” as a concept. The reality of narco-violence suggests that “violence” itself is insufficient to capture it, that we need to redeploy and reconceptualize “brutality” as a concept that better captures this reality. Brutality is more than violence, other to cruelty, and distinct from horror and terror—all concepts that are normally used interchangeably with brutality, but which, as the analysis suggests, ought not to be. In narco-culture, the
normalization of brutality into everyday life is a condition upon which the absolute erasure or derealization of people is made possible.

Throughout, an attempt is made to think about extreme situated violence as opposed to abstract conceptual violence; in particular, I seek to draw attention to the kind of violence that provokes silence and detachment, a violence that demands objectification and dehumanization, a violence that in its ubiquitousness and everydayness has become ontological, a violence that in its excess overflows its own concept and thus requires a new name: brutality. The brutality that we think about is situated in a specific space-time, but it exists elsewhere, under different guises. As in those different spaces, the dead in narco-culture are innumerable, and the brutality that kills is said to be unspeakable (although we will make an effort to speak it here), to give it a name. The Washington Post, in passing, called the rising dead of narco-culture a “A Crisis of Civilization.” This book is about this crisis, and about the intuitions that it motivates.

Expressions of hope can be powerful forces for good within social justice movements, by motivating engagement and fostering connections among the community. However, in this paper, I argue that expressions of hope can also be toxic and hurtful. Toxic hope expresses the same affective content as hope, but functions to perpetuate burnout, hurt, and disconnection within a community. When expressed in certain ways, messages of hope can function as a testimonial injustice, silencing those who have experienced negative events. Understanding the social function of toxic hope can reveal the circumstances that promote beneficial expressions of hope.

Hope expresses what one yearns for, specifically: “hope involves a positive attitude towards some desirable state of affairs, allied with a belief that the event is possible.” (Brady, p.185.) 1 Toxic hope can manifest as tone-deaf expressions of positivity that drown out negative attitudes from other members of the community. Standing in solidarity with others often requires grief and emotional acknowledgment of deep injustices. Toxic hope is often manifested in a sort of response like “at least it wasn’t any worse!” or “Things will get better now!” There are at least two ways that such expressions of hope are destructive.

First, expressions of hope can function to tone-police the individual who is testifying about their trauma, implying that the conversation should stay positive. This demonstrates a lack of empathy, and an inability to validate a testifier’s negative emotions. This unfairly (and often prejudicially) undermines the testifier’s knowledge and constitutes a testimonial injustice.2 Pivoting a conversation on injustice directly to a positive hope for the future can function as a way to distract from, and silence, the affectively negative testimony of those who have been wronged. For example, following the #metoo movement, some responses on twitter were distracting and ego-focused, even when expressing positive affective content.3 Second, expressions of hope can focus on the fact that change is possible or even likely. However, in the case of many forms of injustice, there are good empirical reasons to be cautious in believing that widespread change is likely to happen soon. Testifiers sharing a significant experience of injustice might also highlight the ways that injustice is deeply entrenched in our society. Blithely expressing an over-confidence in social change can again serve to dismiss and silence testifiers. Denying the difficulty of creating change, especially to those already working as advocates, is a form of gaslighting.4 When expressions of hope function to distract, silence, or dismiss the experiences of others they are at odds with the goals of social justice movements. Understanding the ways that toxic expressions of hope function, we can be on guard with our own habits. Hope expression first requires deep empathy with other members of a community. Hope should not be used to silence or forbid expressions of disappointment, which are also appropriate.
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<th>Smithka Paula</th>
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2020 has been a “dark time” for the United States (as well as for the rest of the world) due to the Coronavirus pandemic with the tremendous toll taken on health and life, together with the resultant economic turmoil. However, the country has also experienced social unrest as a response to cases of police brutality against minorities. Despite these adversities, the country also celebrated the 100th anniversary of the ratification of the 19th amendment—a bit of light in the darkness. Though this last year can be characterized as “dark times” for our nation, one could argue that the last four years under the Trump administration have been “dark times.” We have seen an unprecedented disregard for the nature of truth, with the promoting of a false equivalence between truth and lies. We have observed the undermining of facts in the form of science denial and “alternative facts” Mind viruses have spread widely via “fake news” and social media which have stoked anger, fostered and reinforced racism and political polarization. And crucially, under this administration, we have witnessed an erosion of the foundational principles of democracy. Is there hope in these dark times? There is. With COVID-19 vaccines being developed and distributed, there is hope for a restoration of health. Unfortunately, mind viruses are more difficult to treat, but with the problem of systemic racism being more widely acknowledged and the need for change recognized, steps toward achieving social justice can be taken. And, with the election of a history-making Biden-Harris administration, there is hope that the distinction between truth and lies may again re-emerge and the principles of democracy restored.

Taft Anna

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<th>Taft Anna</th>
<th>Action and Fabrication:</th>
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Hannah Arendt designates “three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action” (1), each with its corresponding way of approaching what is seen. She argues that frustration with the risks of action, combined with the modern belief that we can know only what we make, led to elevation of the mode of work, or fabrication, as the highest ideal and to its overgeneralization to the realm of human affairs. Many contemporary trends, ranging from the focus on STEM education to the limitless extraction of oil and minerals to the drive to plan social change, illustrate the degree to which fabrication has become the dominant mode. The vocabulary of making now structures nearly all discussions of public concerns. Development is a prime example of a domain dominated by an instrumental perspective from which human affairs are approached as though they could be planned and fabricated. This approach effectively banishes action from many areas of public life that otherwise would be politically contested.

Fabrication is guided by instrumentality, because the goal of the fabrication process is a defined end, the idea of which exists prior to the work. The extension of this instrumental framework to the realm of human affairs has several dangerous consequences. First, it means that any means are justified if they serve the chosen ends. Second, it justifies violence; the “element of violation and violence is present in all fabrication, and homo faber, the creator of the human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature” (139). Not only is there violence in the making, but also in the only kind of unmaking that can be done from within the mode of fabrication. Third, treating human affairs as though they could be fabricated precludes meaning. Nevertheless, the instrumental thinking of the mode of fabrication is essential in its appropriate sphere. Once particular ends are agreed upon, it is useful to follow a set of steps that organize the means to those ends. The mode of action, however, must limit this instrumental thinking, rather than be subsumed within it. Recently, there has been greater recognition of the importance of relationships in social sector work; however, calls to revitalize relational attitudes are usually embedded within instrumental approaches and fail to avoid the hazards of applying the mode of fabrication to human affairs. In my work with The Tandana Foundation, a U.S.-based organization that collaborates with communities in Ecuador and Mali on a variety of initiatives, I have
experienced the pitfalls that can arise when either the mode of action or the mode of fabrication outranges its appropriate sphere. In this paper, I describe the differences between the modes of action and of fabrication and the appropriate spheres for each. Drawing on examples from my experience in the development field, I will show the importance of integrating action and fabrication in an organization’s work. We will see that information available from a distant viewpoint can inform action undertaken at ground level without instrumentalizing human affairs.

| Tahvildary Negin | Building Peace, Repairing Hope: Restorative Mediation an Effective, Collaborative Approach | negin@mail.fresnostate.edu | Fresno State University |

In recent years, peace education has directed considerable attention to embedding more restorative practices through collective, collaborative approaches. A field that has been for so long cognitively focused, is now shifting towards elaborating more practical solutions that can help create positive social change. Restorative mediation as a sample methodology in peacebuilding, enables participants to elaborate on mutually acceptable measures for cooperative problem-solving. Aimed to increase the effectiveness and sustainability of conflict engagement efforts, the restorative approach encourages innovative thinking and new solutions in addressing the parties’ needs and wants when assessing a conflict situation. This article provides a general framework for evaluating mediation through an interest-based versus positional based negotiation which ultimately generates hope among the stakeholders through self-fulfilling prophecies. Through a structural functionalists lens we argue that this collective hope will, in turn, entail more socially desirable elements such as unity and solidarity that fosters peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts. In this perspective, we begin by assessing the effectiveness of restorative practices at a group level moving through a consideration of conflict in advanced social units and ultimately at an international level.

| Thau Tena | The Free Speech Argument Against Mass Incarceration | tena.thau@spc.ox.ac.uk | University of Oxford |

In recent years, many have raised concerns about what they perceive to be an increasingly hostile climate towards free speech in the West. But missing from this discourse is a recognition of what may be the most grave and far reaching assault on free speech of our time: mass incarceration. Those in prison are severely limited in their opportunities to communicate with others, and prisoners’ vulnerability to reprisal further erodes their freedom to speak. Even after release, ex-prisoners’ voices are suppressed: many are disenfranchised from voting, and economic disempowerment further mutes their political voice. But by committing a crime, does one forfeit their speech rights? I argue not. Incarcerated individuals’ speech rights, I contend, are not wholly theirs to forfeit; when incarcerated people are denied opportunities to speak, the rest of society is deprived of the right to hear what they have to say. This silencing is particularly problematic when it comes to hearing (ex)prisoners’ views on policing and criminal justice reform – issues upon which they have special epistemic insight.

| Walker James | Towards a Radical Peace Studies | james.walker@depaul.edu | De Paul University |

As the Trump presidency comes to an end, a substantial fear on the left is that this moment, rather than marking the birth of an era of progress bent upon dismantling social inequities and oppressive structures, will simply lead to the entrenchment of these very things, as we witness a return to the status quo of problematic centrist politics, which in the wake of Trump, is able to masquerade itself as a “progressive” victory. The fear is that counter-hegemonic forces truly dedicated to a dismantling of the very structures at the root of an oppressive world order, which has systematically oppressed various populations both within the U.S. and outside of its borders since long before the ascendancy of Trump, will lose rather than gain ground. Within the discipline of “peace studies,” there has been a recent upsurge in the recognition at the rhetorical level of the importance of structural inequalities to the task of moving us away from violence and towards some manner of positive peace. But does “classical” peace studies have the capacity to actually dismantle or, at least, displace, the oppressive
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
Conference Program

and violent structures underlying the world within which we live? Or, to the contrary, must peace studies move in a more radical direction, developing new methods and approaches, if it is to be able to make substantial progress on this front? After having spent over a decade working in peace-building initiatives in east Africa, I’ve grown increasingly skeptical of the capacity of a “classical” approach to peace studies being able to provide much, if any, benefit to the task of fundamental structural change. Indeed, much of that work remains wedded to paradigms of thought and power that are no different from those at the root of the modern Western logic of warfare. So, where do we go from here? In this paper, after briefly laying out the contours of what I term the “classical paradigm” of peace studies, I will sketch what it would mean to engage in a more radical form of peace studies. In doing so I will draw on the work of figures from within the Black Radical Tradition, such as Sylvia Wynter and Vincent Harding, as well as two thinkers no less radical, but often misperceived in this regard, namely James Baldwin and bell hooks. Through engagement with these thinkers, and the radical tradition they represent, one can come to discern the tools of radical resistance that, by design, are more capable of dismantling the precise hegemonic structures at the root of the modern Western paradigm of war, than have been employed by peace studies as classically construed. In this paper I will also draw extensively on the work of the decolonial thinker Nelson Maldonado-Torres, who reveals at the very core of western modernity “a fundamental logic of warfare.” It is precisely this logic, which births not only modern variants of fascism and oppression, but also classical peace studies as we know it today, that must be displaced through radical resistance.

I present a skeptical critique, internal to the rights-based perspective of the self-defense literature, of the moral permissibility of killing in defense of one life. Wrongful killing is especially grave because of its scope and finality as a rights violation: killing undermines the basis of all rights and welfare, and it is impossible for the victim to overcome it or receive reparation. I propose a principle of proportionate caution – the graver the moral risk posed by an act, the more certain one must be of its justification for it to be permissible. Since the risk in killing is maximally grave, it is impermissible without complete certainty of its justification.

Accounts of defensive harm may be belief-relative, evidence-relative, or fact-relative. The first is implausible since it allows killing based on wildly irrational beliefs. But action-guidance is necessarily belief-relative, as acting on the other accounts is merely acting on beliefs about what the evidence or facts are. Some oppose capital punishment because of mistakes and racial bias in application, both of which also apply to self-defense, plus self-defense relies on individual judgment under pressure rather than conviction beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.

If the relevant proportionality was between acts, lethal defense would be disproportionate, since the aggressor could at most be guilty of attempted murder. Instead, the relevant proportionality is between harm inflicted and harm prevented, but the latter quantity is unknown. Rodin proposes adding a “moral contingency” to proportionality calculations for war, due to the unpredictability of potential harms. I propose applying this to killing in self-defense, resulting in its being disproportionate. Although wrongful killing by the aggressor would also be grave, the duty to refrain from rights violations is stronger than that to prevent them.

By the standard account of self-defense, an aggressor is liable to lethal defensive harm if: (1) they pose a lethal threat, (2) it is unjust, (3) they are sufficiently responsible or culpable, and (4) lethal defense is necessary. The rationale is that given a forced choice between lives, the person who created the situation should bear the cost. It is possible to be mistaken about any of these criteria. Factors (1), (3), and (4) involve thresholds, which the gravity of wrongful killing pushes us toward drawing on the high end out of caution. A high threshold culpability account particularly makes liability hard to determine, since one is unlikely to know if an aggressor has a partial excuse.

We don’t know with certainty if a situation is a forced choice between lives, and aiming to kill in self-defense generally increases its likelihood of being one, so it must be explained why this does not also make the defender liable in the standard account. If lethal defense is permissible because evidence-relative justified, like if someone jokingly points a gun, this is independent of any actual threat, and based purely on the aggressor’s culpability, which remains afterwards. This would collapse the distinction between defense and punishment, and make capital punishment permissible for aggravated assault.
Critics of the Holocaust ask: Why did the Jews not offer more resistance? The underestimation of resistance by Jews and others during the Holocaust is a significant historical oversight. I make use of Joel Feinberg’s notion that dignity is respect-as-observance of another’s rights, where rights underlie dignity. I suggest that those who did resist were faced with several choices in defense of their dignity, and I suggest that their dignity lay in their fundamental right to life. The defense of one’s right to life may be formulated as a categorical imperative: I ought to defend my right to life.

While the defense of one’s right to life may be stated as a categorical imperative, in practice it often appears as a hypothetical imperative. I suggest that resisters followed a moral pathway analyzable in terms of hypothetical imperatives. In other words, the way that one’s dignity is defended may better be described as a hypothetical imperative that incorporates the contingencies of the victims’ circumstances.

The victim who does not choose actively to resist the perpetrators could say, “(1) I am a victim, I am being wronged, and I should do nothing.” This first hypothetical imperative may strike us as self-defeating. This may count as a basic claim on dignity. In choosing a path forward, victims may instead adopt one or more of the following hypothetical imperatives: (2) I should collaborate with the perpetrators. (3) I should resist by joining a group of belligerents who have military experience. (4) I should become a martyr. (5) I should offer individual violent resistance. (6) I should depend upon NGO’s, allies or mercenaries who will aid and abet my efforts in self-defense by supplying weapons or personnel. (7) Or even, I should offer individual non-violent resistance.

Resistors who choose to act in ways that rise above the basic claim on dignity adopt as their practical imperative: I should act in a way that demonstrates resistance.

I discuss how resisters could and did adopt these hypothetical imperatives to defend their right to life. These hypothetical imperatives may be subject to more than one test such as universalizability or practicality. I explore whether any one of these hypothetical imperatives succeeds in better defending the dignity of the resisters. I suggest that many of these imperatives proves successful but self-defeating. The seventh imperative that appears to offer no sufficient defense of the resisters seems to be the only imperative that is not self-defeating.

In addition, this path forward is not driven by hate. I recall that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “Hate is just as injurious to the hater as it is to the hated (332).” I argue that by recognizing the humanity and dignity of the other, the resistor is better positioned to recognize his or her own dignity.